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Waivering About the Dirty Business of
Plea Bargains—A Comment
Jonathan Shapiro*
Praise to Leanna Minix for untangling the twisted paths
federal courts have blazed, which all lead to the same dead end.
Ms. Minix hacked through the undergrowth of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 111—the rule governing what judges must do
to ensure that a defendant’s guilty plea will survive later
scrutiny—and shined a light on the ways different circuits have
chosen to accomplish that task. As she has convincingly
demonstrated, most circuits employ overly narrow tests for
evaluating claimed violations of one of the most controversial, yet
now “standard” provisions in federal plea bargains—waiver of the
right to appeal.2
The federal courts have made quick work of most attempts by
defendants to review the results of plea bargains that turned out
to be no bargain. This is most frequently the case when the
sentence a defendant fully and justifiably believed he would get
turns out to have been just a fond wish. Courts are able to evade
a higher level of scrutiny on review because of the restrictive
Dominguez-Benitez test,3 which holds that a defendant who failed
to object to a faulty Rule 11 colloquy is barred from appealing
unless he shows “a reasonable probability that, but for the error,
he would not have entered the plea.”4
Use of this test is particularly troubling when the bargain
requires the defendant to waive his appeal rights, which in the
context of a guilty plea boils down to a single right—the statutory
right to have an appellate court review the propriety of the
* Visiting Professor of Law at Washington and Lee University School of
Law and partner in Greenspun Shapiro, P.C., a northern Virginia law firm.
1. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
2. Id. 11(b)(1)(N).
3. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004).
4. Id. at 83.
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sentence, within strict limits.5 There is no appeal from any other
aspect of the prosecution (e.g. bad searches, bad wire-taps, bad
interrogations). All other claims are automatically waived once
the defendant pleads guilty. Nevertheless, as Ms. Minix notes, all
the circuits have held allegedly “bargained-for” appellate waivers
constitutional, and Rule 11(b)(1)(N) “green-lights” the practice by
requiring that the court specifically address that waiver in the
plea colloquy. When a defendant waives appellate rights, there is
no relief when the court imposes an unexpected sentence. But
taken to its extreme, a valid appellate waiver might even bar
claims that the plea was not voluntarily and intelligently made,
which is a constitutional baseline in the world of guilty plea
jurisprudence.6
Given this sorry state of affairs, Ms. Minix’s suggestion that
the courts explicitly adopt an expanded test for reviewing a
5. This right is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2016) as a part of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. The provision states, in pertinent part:
(a) Appeal by a defendant. A defendant may file a notice of appeal in
the district court for review of an otherwise final sentence if the
sentence—
(1) was imposed in violation of law;
(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the
sentencing guidelines; or
(3) is greater than the sentence specified in the applicable guideline
range to the extent that the sentence includes a greater fine or term
of imprisonment, probation, or supervised release than the maximum
established in the guideline range, or includes a more limiting
condition of probation or supervised release under section 3563(b)(6)
or (b)(11) [18 USCS § 3563(b)(6) or (b)(11)] than the maximum
established in the guideline range; or
(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing
guideline and is plainly unreasonable.
Section 3742 allows the government to appeal a sentence, and further allows
defendants to appeal when the sentence imposed exceeded a specific sentence
set out in the plea agreement under Rule 11(e)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Id. §§ 3742(b)–(c).
6. See United States v. Mutschler, 152 F. Supp. 3d 1332, 1337 (W.D.
Wash. 2016) (“Almost all of the circuits have concluded that, absent some
egregious circumstance or a miscarriage of justice, a unilateral waiver of the
right to appeal is enforceable . . . .” (emphasis added)); see, e.g., United States v.
Guillen, 561 F.3d 527, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting that a waiver is invalid if the
district court “utterly fails” to apply proper sentencing factors, if the sentence
exceeds the statutory maximum, or if the sentence was based on race or
religion).
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defendant’s un-objected-to failure of the trial court to ensure the
defendant understands he is giving up his right to appeal is, in a
word, appealing. Her test adds to the Dominguez-Benitez test by
requiring appellate courts ensure the defendant’s waiver is
voluntarily and intelligently made.
Of course, a quick review of the cases shows what should be
no surprise. Courts are extremely hostile to efforts to undo guilty
pleas. Expanding the test governing un-objected-to, faulty
colloquies about appellate waiver will bring needed uniformity, as
Ms. Minix argues, but may still not lead to relief for an aggrieved
defendant. The larger problem is the gross unfairness of modern
federal plea bargaining itself.
___________________
How is it that the plea-bargaining industry is so unfair? And
why is it that forcing a defendant to waive her rights to appeal a
sentence is so unjust? The thoughts in this Comment are not
intended to thoroughly address what I perceive to be the
underlying problems with plea bargaining as it exists today.
Rather, they reflect my quick take on the issue based on my own
experience as a lawyer who has spent the past forty-two years
representing those charged with federal offenses and negotiating
with federal prosecutors. Others have written extensively on the
legal underpinnings of plea bargaining in the modern age, and I
recommend their works to you.7
As preface, it is my belief—a belief shared by many criminal
defense lawyers—that in the modern era, plea bargaining is a
sham. Bargaining implies that the parties come to the table
operating with the same set of rules. Each side may have
7. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2465 (2004) (arguing that the common
justification for plea bargaining, the “shadow-of-trial model is, however, far too
simplistic”); Richard Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101
YALE L.J. 1979, 1980 (1992) (arguing that “the structural flaws [of the plea
bargaining system] impair both due process and crime control values”); Ken
Strutin, Truth, Justice, and the American Style Plea Bargain, 77 ALB. L. REV.
825, 829 (2014) (examining “Supreme Court plea bargaining decisions” and
“their implications for the competing goals of truth versus process”); Robert E.
Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909,
1967 (1992) (“Though it has long been understood that plea bargaining is a
species of contract, the debate about it has been framed not in the language of
bargains, but chiefly the language of rights.”).
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certain factual, legal, or moral advantages that may sway the
other’s position. But the framework for negotiation is neutral.
That is not the case in the federal criminal justice system.

It is probably old news that the Sentencing Reform Act of
19848 drastically changed the playing field for defense lawyers,
and with it the landscape for citizens charged with federal
offenses.9 Before that law ushered in the era of determinate
sentencing, judges were free to sentence as they deemed proper
anywhere within the upper and lower penalty limits established
by Congress. Sentencing hearings could take hours or a full day
as defense lawyers called family members, neighbors, school
teachers, co-workers, doctors, and others to testify about the
defendant’s background, good works, and prospects. Sentencing
experts offered sentencing plans involving community service,
restitution, alternative incarceration, and any number of creative
alternatives to a lengthy prison term. Because of the great
discretion available to judges, the pressure to plead guilty was
reduced. It is true that there were incentives to avoid trial, and
that most defendants did end up negotiating some sort of plea
bargain. But it was also true that in many cases, there was little
to be lost by going to trial. If found guilty, a defendant could still
make the arguments that he would have made at trial and that
the sentencing judge would have considered after a plea of guilty.
The sentencing guidelines swept all that aside. The infamous
Sentencing Table10 and the command of the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984 made judges largely irrelevant because, with
extremely minor exceptions, a sentence falls within a particular
range based on a mechanical calculus of sentencing factors.11 At
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2016).
9. See generally Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing
Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993); Stanley A. Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of
1984: A Practical Appraisal, 36 UCLA L. REV. 83 (1988).
10. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2016).
11. Indeed, the harshness of the sentencing guidelines led at least one
federal judge to resign. See Criticizing Sentencing Rules, U.S. Judge Resigns,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/30/us/criticizingsentencing-rules-us-judge-resigns.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2017) (quoting U.S.
District Judge J. Lawrence Irving as saying, “If I remain on the bench I have no
choice but to follow the law . . . . I just can’t, in good conscience, continue to do
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the same time, it made federal prosecutors extraordinarily
powerful in dictating what sentence a defendant would receive,
by way of unreviewable charging decisions.12 The guidelines
specifically removed from consideration many of the factors that
had been the centerpiece of pre-guidelines sentencing
arguments.13 I have often heard judges rue the sentence they
were forced to impose, call it irrational or unjust, then direct that
the nineteen-year-old, non-violent, first-offender crack defendant
who stood before the court serve 240 months in prison.14

this”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Other judges simply
refused to impose the required sentence. See, e.g., Timothy Williams, Judge
Refuses to Set Sentence for Ex-Crack Dealer, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 19, 1996),
http://articles.latimes.com/1996-03-19/local/me-48652_1_sentencing-guidelines
(last visited Feb. 3, 2017) (describing U.S. District Court Judge Terry J. Hatter
of the Central District of California as declaring, “I will not be a party to this
injustice . . . . Congress cannot make me do this; the president cannot make me
do this”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. As noted by U.S. District Judge John Coughenour of the Western
District of Washington: “So much of sentencing discretion is vested now in the
U.S. Attorney’s Office. By their charging decisions, they can tie the hands of the
sentencing judge, particularly on mandatory minimums. And [prosecutors’]
discretion, by the way, is exercised in darkness . . . . In fact, we are precluded
from reviewing those charging decisions.” Matthew Van Meter, One Judge
Makes the Case for Judgment, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 25, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/ politics/archive/2016/02/one-judge-makes-the-casefor-judgment/463380/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2017) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). The prosecution does not deny this reality. The Atlantic
article continues: “Mark Osler, a law professor who worked as a prosecutor in
Detroit in the 1990s, says: ‘I had all the power. It was about whether I filed a
notice of enhancement or gave points for acceptance of responsibility. It’s not
reviewable. It’s within the discretion of the prosecutor.’” Id.
13. Guidelines Chapter 5, Part H, titled “Specific Offender Characteristics”,
places limits on, and in some cases bars consideration of, many traditional
sentencing factors such as education, vocational skills, employment record,
family ties and responsibilities, community ties, age, mental and emotional
conditions, physical condition, drug or alcohol dependence or abuse, gambling
addiction, military, civic, charitable, or public service, employment-related
contributions, or record of prior good works. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL ch. 5, pt. H (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
14. I particularly recall the pained face of the Honorable Albert V. Bryan,
Jr., of the Eastern District of Virginia, after calculating a young defendant’s
sentencing guidelines and arriving at a horribly inappropriate yet mandated
sentencing range. The judge then said, “With that as bleak background, I’ll hear
what you have to say, Mr. Shapiro, as to where within the range the sentence
ought to fall.”
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The harsh Sentencing Table and uncompromising sentencing
enhancements did not work the sea change in criminal justice
alone. They were aided and abetted by two other changes in the
law that conspire by vastly increasing the pressure to waive trial
and plead guilty. Those changes were Congress’s imposition of
extreme mandatory minimum sentences15 and Section 5K1.1 of
the Sentencing Guidelines.16 Together, they are the one-two
punch (more accurately, a punch and a push) that knocks a
defense attorney out of the ring.
The “punch” is the advent of mandatory minimum sentences.
There is recognition today from all corners that many of the
15. Mandatory minimum sentences are established by Congress, not the
Sentencing Commission. HISTORY OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES AND
STATUTORY RELIEF MECHANISMS 1, 29, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-andreports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Chapter_02.pdf
(describing Congress’s authority to mandate minimum sentences as dating back
to 1790 and still in effect); see also Justin Sink, Obama Calls on Congress to
Overhaul Mandatory Minimum Sentences, BLOOMBERG (July 14, 2015, 6:22 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-14/obama-calls-on-congressto-overhaul-mandatory-minimum-sentences (last visited Feb. 3, 2017)
(describing the president’s call to Congress to minimize heavy sentencing for
non-violent drug offenders) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
16. Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, titled “Substantial
Assistance to Authorities” states:
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has
provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart
from the guidelines.
(a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for
reasons stated that may include, but are not limited to, consideration
of the following:
(1)
the court’s evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the
defendant’s assistance, taking into consideration the government’s
evaluation of the assistance rendered;
(2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information
or testimony provided by the defendant;
(3) the nature and extent of the defendant’s assistance;
(4)
any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the
defendant or his family resulting from his assistance;
(5) the timeliness of the defendant’s assistance.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2016).
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mandatory minimum sentences enacted by Congress were wildly
harsh. For years, the Sentencing Commission itself urged
Congress to repeal the mandatory minimum drug laws, arguing
that they hindered application of the sentencing guidelines
approach.17 Today, even traditional law-and-order voices in
Congress and elsewhere have come to understand that change is
required.18 Still, though progress has been made, thousands of
low-level, non-violent drug offenders caught up in the old system
wait for the president to grant them relief by way of pardon.
While the mandatory minimum sentence is often severe, it is
often not the only bad news for the defendant. The Sentencing
Guidelines require upward adjustment of sentencing ranges
based upon a number of factors.19 For example, in drug cases, as
the total weight of the drug increases, so does the guideline
range.20 In addition, if the judge finds that the defendant played
more than a minor role in the scheme, the guidelines may
increase. If the defendant obstructed justice in any of the myriad
ways recognized by the guidelines—for example, urging a coconspirator not to talk or disposing of drug debt notes—the
guidelines may increase. If the defendant possessed a firearm,
17. See, e.g., Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 111th Cong. 16 (2009) (Statement of
Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Acting Chair, United States Sentencing Commission),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-andreports/testimony/20090521_Hinojosa_Testimony.pdf (urging reduction of the
mandatory minimum sentence structure relating to crack cocaine).
18. See Criminal Justice Reform, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, https://www.white
house.gov/issues/criminal-justice-reform (last visited Dec. 28, 2016) (detailing
the White House’s policy position on “making our criminal justice system more
fair”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Alex Altman, Koch
Brother Teams Up With Liberals on Criminal Justice Reform, TIME (Jan. 29,
2015), http://time.com/3686797/charles-koch-criminal-justice/?iid=sr-link1 (last
visited Feb. 3 2017) (reporting on bipartisan cooperation for criminal justice
reform) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
19. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 3–5 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2016).
20. Law enforcement agents, well aware of the increased sentences
available based on the total weight of drugs sold during the scheme, often make
multiple buys from a defendant for the sole purpose of raising the eventual
sentence. Courts often reject defense claims that this is improper “sentencing
entrapment.” See United States v. Watkins, 179 F.3d 489, 503 n.14 (6th Cir.
1999) (“We note that this court has yet to acknowledge that sentencing
entrapment, even if proven, constitutes a valid basis for a downward
departure.”).
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the guidelines increase. A prior record causes the guidelines to
increase, as does the fact that a defendant committed the crime
within a certain period of time after release from prison.21
The mandatory minimum sentence, which often increases
based on factors like those outlined above, then sets the stage for
plea bargaining. Faced with a harsh sentence that the defendant
cannot avoid if he is convicted at trial, defendants—particularly
young defendants faced with ten year minimums, or even greater
sentences—face tremendous pressure to plead guilty if there is
any way that such a plea could somehow reduce prison time.
After the “punch” comes the “push,” because there is a way to
avoid the harshest sentence. Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing
Guidelines dangles a life-preserver in front of the defendant. This
provision allows the defendant to avoid any mandatory minimum
sentence and to avoid the effect of the guideline’s sentencing
calculations, in return for “substantial assistance” to the
government in its investigation of others.22 If the defendant
agrees to cooperate by telling the government everything he
knows concerning the crime with which he is charged, as well as
all unrelated criminal activity, the government may file papers
asking the judge to sentence him below what would otherwise be
required, even below the otherwise mandatory minimum sentence.
The prospect of relief from harsh mandatory minimums and
multiple enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines proves
too much for most defendants to walk away from. Quite the
opposite. There is often a race to the prosecutor’s office once word
hits the street that an investigation is under way. Prosecutors
make it quite clear that the first in line will receive the largest
reward, and that the benefit to each subsequent cooperator will
diminish, then vanish.
The race to the prosecutor has had a major effect on the role
of defense attorneys in at least three ways. First, required
investigation and discovery take a back seat to the need to get in
21. The sentencing guidelines are much more Byzantine than these few
examples illustrate. They also allow for reductions in the sentencing range
based on certain factors. But in many cases, even if the calculation yields a
sentencing range below the mandatory minimum, the court has no authority to
ignore that minimum.
22. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (detailing the substantial
assistance provision of the Sentencing Guidelines).
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early. Even when a plea bargain rather than trial is the
overwhelmingly correct choice to make, it is elementary that an
attorney armed with knowledge of all the facts—the strengths
and weaknesses of the evidence, of the witnesses, of the legal
basis for the charge—is in the best position to reach the best deal.
Knowledge is power. And as they say, you do not want to go to a
gun fight with a knife. But in the rush to get in early, all that is
pushed to the side. Taking time to investigate the government’s
case means that some other defendant will be sitting with the
prosecutor first.
Second, defense attorneys become advocates for the
government. Fear of the horrendous result that can flow from
moving cautiously, investigating, and preparing (not to mention
going to trial), pushes attorneys to push their clients to cooperate.
Attorneys often may not give their clients comprehensive advice
about the trial option, in many cases because the defense
attorney does not even have the facts upon which to base a
competent assessment.
Third, defense attorneys are often forced to push their clients
to the limit in their cooperation with the government. Here is a
common situation: the defendant and his attorney sit with the
prosecutor and the FBI agent who headed up the investigation.
The defendant tells them what he knows. Either because he
believes (perhaps incorrectly) that the defendant is holding back
information, or because it is a ploy, the agent declares that the
defendant is not revealing everything, or that what the defendant
has told him does not square with the facts that the government
already knows. The defense attorney asks to speak with her
client alone. The attorney reminds the client that unless the
government believes he has revealed all he knows, there will be
no deal. The attorney asks, “Is it possible that the package
weighed two kilos, like the agent says, rather than one?” The
defendant says that yes, it is possible. When questioning begins
again, the defendant says, “Well, it likely was two kilos—I was
mistaken about that.”
The intense pressure to please the government flows from
the provision in Section 5K1.1 that ties sentencing relief to a
request from the government. That is, unless the government, in
its sole discretion, asks the court to give the defendant the benefit
of Section 5K1.1, the defendant will get no benefit. The defense
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has no power to even make the request. It is also true that even
when the defendant cooperated fully and told the government
truthfully everything he knows, the government is never
obligated to seek sentencing relief for him. The government may
say, “Thanks for your information. We believe you told us
everything you know. But, your information is not particularly
useful to us. Have a nice day.”
This too may have an unfortunate effect. Understanding that
unless they have information that will actually help the
government, cooperating defendants may yield to the pressure
and “enhance” the facts to secure a sentencing benefit. Indeed, in
1998, a panel of the Tenth Circuit held that government offers to
reduce a cooperating witness’s sentence in return for testimony
amounted to bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2).23 The en
banc Tenth Circuit reversed the panel’s decision24 and no circuit
has adopted the original panel’s conclusions—but the logic of
panel’s view, if not the legal basis, is weighty. And every defense
attorney I have ever spoken to about the process understands this
powerful incentive to bend the truth.
Further compounding the troubling effect of this type of
testimony is the fact that the government will never agree in
advance to reward the cooperating defendant with a request for a
lower sentence. Rather, the government waits until after the
23. See United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1350 (10th Cir. 1998)
The obvious purpose of the government’s promised actions was to
reduce [the defendant’s] jail time, and it is difficult to imagine
anything more valuable than personal physical freedom . . . . Our
basis for determining these promises were of value is that the record
indicates [the defendant] subjectively valued them. They were all he
bargained for in return for his testimony and guilty plea.
rev’d en banc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999). Section 201(c)(2) provides in
pertinent part:
Whoever directly or indirectly, gives, offers or promises anything of
value to any person, for or because of the testimony under oath or
affirmation given or to be given by such person as a witness upon a
trial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any court . . . . shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (2016).
24. See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1298 (1999) (en banc)
(“We now hold 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) does not apply to the United States or an
Assistant United States Attorney functioning within the official scope of the
office.”).
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cooperator has pleaded guilty and testified. This puts additional
pressure on the testifying cooperator to please the government.
The unbalanced bargaining table is tilted yet further, as
mentioned before, by the fact that the prosecutor holds enormous
power to shape the battleground before the fight even starts. The
prosecution may select the most punitive of available charges and
threaten further sentencing increases with claims of gun
possession, inflated drug weights, or alleged acts of obstruction.
Factors such as these can greatly impact the sentencing range
under the guidelines.25
These pressures are in the great number of cases too much to
bear, particularly when the defendant is young and scared. Better
to take the plea and hope the government rewards the defendant
with a request for a sentence reduction or with some other
concession concerning sentencing factors. This is the point when
appeal waiver provisions come into play.
The vast number of plea bargains in the federal system are
known as “non-binding.”26 This means that even when the parties
25. It must be noted that in United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court
ruled that the mandatory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines was
unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 266 (2005) (ruling that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory). While
this was a welcomed change, the guidelines still exist and are still the required
framework for devising a sentence, but they are no longer mandatory. Judges
must still compute a defendant’s guidelines. Judges are free, however, to
sentence above or below the guidelines (called a “variance” from the guidelines).
But in practice, most judges still sentence within the guidelines range. All the
ways the charging decision and application of various sentencing factors can
shape the sentence still exist, as does Section 5K1.1 (the “substantial
assistance” provision). See supra note 16 and accompanying discussion
(outlining factors the court may take into consideration when departing from
the guidelines).
26. For example, Rule 11(c)(1)(B) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
states that in the plea agreement the prosecution may:
recommend, or agree not to oppose the defendant’s request, that a
particular sentence or sentencing range is appropriate or that a
particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy
statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply (such a
recommendation or request does not bind the court) . . . .
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(B). Compare this with Rule 11(c)(1)(C), which states
that the prosecution may:
agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate
disposition of the case, or that a particular provision of the
Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing factor does
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agree that a certain sentencing range under the Sentencing
Guidelines is the appropriate one, or that certain enhancements
like leadership role or obstruction do not apply, the court is not
bound by those agreements. If the court concludes, for example,
that the defendant is responsible for five kilograms of cocaine
rather than the two kilograms to which the government and the
defense have agreed, the court will sentence the defendant based
on the higher weight. In my experience, if the prosecution and the
defense agree on sentencing factors, most courts will abide by
that agreement—but not always. It certainly has happened that a
defendant who was told he will likely receive a sentence of, say
sixty months—a sentence the government and the defense have
“agreed upon”—gets a sentence of ninety months instead.
It is often the case as well that the government and the
defense will agree to disagree about the application of a
particular sentencing factor. The plea bargain will note such a
disagreement and that the issue is for the court to resolve. For
example, the defendant may claim that his criminal history score
is less than what the government believes it is. This is not an
uncommon occurrence, both because the rules for determining
this score are complex and because the case law interpreting
those rules diverges in different directions.27 In another example,
the defense and the prosecution may disagree about whether the
sentencing range should increase because the defendant used a
“special skill” in committing the crime. Again, the rules can be
read in different ways and the cases interpreting those rules have
led to varying results.28
The sentencing court’s resolution of these disagreements can
have a huge impact on a sentence. This is when the unfairness of
or does not apply (such a recommendation or request binds the court
once the court accepts the plea agreement).
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C).
27. See, e.g., Michael Edmund O’Neill, Abraham’s Legacy: An Empirical
Assessment of (Nearly) First-Time Offenders in the Federal System, 42 B.C. L.
REV. 291, 301 (2001) (providing background on the criminal history category
system and its role the Sentencing Guidelines).
28. For a general discussion of the developments regarding the role of the
criminal history category in the Sentencing Guidelines, see Sentencing, 45 GEO.
L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 787, 788 n.2121 (presenting a multitude of cases in
which defendants disputed the classification and effects of their criminal history
categories on appeal).
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the plea bargaining process comes home to roost. When a
defendant has been coerced into waiving his appellate rights as a
result of the government’s insistence—backed up by the threat of
an enormous sentence if the case is tried, and prodded by the
hope of a sentence reduction if there is an agreement—the
defendant has no recourse. What may in fact be an illegal
sentence, or an inappropriate sentence, will be the final sentence.
There will be no review by an appellate court. Case closed.
This result is not what Congress intended. Congress
explicitly provided for sentence appeals in 18 U.S.C. § 3742.29
Section 3742 represents a departure from the longstanding
understanding that there is no appeal from a guilty plea. This
makes all the sense in the world. As Ms. Minix has noted, the
vast number of criminal cases are resolved by guilty pleas. Trials
are rare. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently opined about the
central role of plea bargaining in today’s world when it noted that
[n]inety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four
percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas. The
reality is that plea bargains have become so central to the
administration of the criminal justice system that defense
counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process,
responsibilities that must be met to render the adequate
assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires in
the criminal process at critical stages. Because ours “is for the
most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials,” Lafler v.
Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 157 (2012), it is insufficient simply to
point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that
inoculates any errors in the pretrial process. “To a large
extent . . . horse trading [between prosecutor and defense
counsel] determines who goes to jail and for how long. That is
what plea bargaining is. It is not some adjunct to the criminal
justice system; it is the criminal justice system.” Scott &
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909, 1912
(1992). See also Barkow, Separation of Powers and the
Criminal Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 989, 1034 (2006)
(“[Defendants] who do take their case to trial and lose receive
longer sentences than even Congress or the prosecutor might
think appropriate, because the longer sentences exist on the
books largely for bargaining purposes. This often results in
individuals who accept a plea bargain receiving shorter
29. See supra note 5 and accompanying discussion (detailing the provisions
in Section 3742).
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sentences than other individuals who are less morally culpable
but take a chance and go to trial”). In today’s criminal justice
system, therefore, the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather
than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point
for a defendant.30

This language is a blunt and stunning recognition that plea
bargaining is central to our system of justice, and that trials are
no longer the backstop against errors in charging a citizen.
Particularly chilling is the recognition that “longer sentences
exist on the books largely for bargaining purposes.”31
It is therefore essential that the appellate courts become the
backstop for the plea bargaining process when it has failed the
defendant. The obvious and easiest step is to agree that waivers
of the right to appeal a sentence ought to be banned. In such a
world, the concerns identified by Ms. Minix, as well as her
suggested solution—an excellent and required improvement
under the current regime—fall by the wayside.
This is not an argument that appellate courts should become
an independent sentencing body. Rather, it is only an argument
that review of a sentence claimed to be inappropriate, or claimed
to be flawed under some provision of the Sentencing Guidelines,
ought to be heard by an appellate court (as Congress has already
decided) rather than cast aside because of a provision in the plea
agreement demanded by the prosecution. Given the vast power of
the prosecution, waivers of the right to appeal a sentence are
easily seen as contracts of adhesion. Such waivers in the era of
plea-bargained justice ought to be banned as contrary to basic
fairness. Where plea bargaining is the new trial, the result of that
trial ought to be reviewable when a defendant claims it was
erroneous.
Several lower courts have already taken a step in this
direction. In United States v. Mutschler,32 the court refused to
accept a unilateral appellate waiver, finding that it was

30. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143–44 (2012) (ruling that defense
counsel has a duty to relay a plea offer to a defendant because of the widespread
reliance on plea bargaining).
31. Id.
32. 152 F. Supp. 3d 1332 (W.D. Wash. 2016).
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unenforceable as contrary to public policy. The court cited United
States v. Ready33 and noted
[u]nlike a contemporaneous waiver (for example, the waiver of
the right to remain silent that occurs when a defendant
speaks, or the waiver of the right to have a jury determine
guilt that occurs when a defendant admits guilt), a prospective
waiver raises concerns about the facts known to the defendant
at the time the waiver is executed. Generally, when a guilty
plea is entered and the right to appeal the ensuing sentence is
waived, the scope of the record that will be considered at
sentencing has not yet been defined, the presentence report
has not yet been prepared, the applicable USSG range has not
yet been calculated, and the sentence has not yet been
imposed. Given the quantum of information usually
unavailable at the time of the plea, a prospective waiver of
appellate rights might often be unknowing and unintelligent. 34

The Mutschler court went on to note that unilateral appellate
waivers distort the process. Courts are not infallible, and, as the
court stated, “[t]he criminal justice system is not improved by
insulating from review either simple miscalculations or novel
questions of law.”35 Moreover,
[i]n the wake of Booker, which rendered the sentencing
guidelines merely advisory, we have returned to a sentencing
regime with the potential to generate the types of
unwarranted disparities that Congress attempted to eradicate
in enacting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Only appellate
courts have the vantage necessary to assess whether sentences
are being imposed in a uniform manner within a circuit or
across the country; however, the habitual acceptance and
enforcement of unilateral waivers of appellate rights precludes
such analysis, and is likely to lead to a wide range of
sentences, despite similarities in offense levels and criminal
histories. This “systemic distortion” is further intensified by
the “asymmetry” in appellate rights, which allows the
Government to seek harsher sentences on review, and results

33. See 82 F.3d 551, 559 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[C]ourts may apply general
fairness principles to invalidate particular terms of a plea agreement.”).
34. Mutschler, 152 F. Supp. 3d at 1338–39 (quotation marks and citations
omitted).
35. Id. at 1339.
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in jurisprudence necessarily “skewed” toward restricting the
ways in which district courts may show leniency.36

Likewise, in United States v. Johnson,37 the court refused to
accept a unilateral appeal waiver. The court noted that
[a]s a practical matter, the government has bargaining power
utterly superior to that of the average defendant if only
because the precise charge or charges to be brought—and thus
the ultimate sentence to be imposed under the guidelines
scheme—is up to the prosecution. To vest in the prosecutor
also the power to require the waiver of appeal rights is to add
that much more unconstitutional weight to the prosecutor’s
side of the balance.38

To conclude, the distortions in the criminal justice system
caused by the vastly superior bargaining power of the prosecution
are further warped by denying the defendant the ability to appeal
a flawed or otherwise unexpected sentence. The practice of
demanding sentencing appellate waivers is unfair, unwise, and
unjust.

36.
37.
38.

Id. at 1339–40 (citations omitted).
992 F. Supp. 437 (D.D.C. 1997).
Id. at 439–40.

